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Abstract
This paper investigatesthe role of trust metrics
in attack-resistant public key certiﬁcation. We
present an analytical framework for understand-
ing the effectiveness of trust metrics in resisting
attacks, including a characterization of the space
of possible attacks. Within this framework, we
establish the theoretical best case for a trust met-
ric. Finally, we present a practical trust metric
based on network ﬂow that meets this theoretical
bound.
1 Introduction
Manypublickeyinfrastructureshavebeenpro-
posed and some have been deployed. Almost
all, however, suffer from a worrisome problem: a
compromise of a single key leads to a successful
attack on the entire system. For example, an at-
tacker whogains the root keyof a certiﬁcation hi-
erarchy such as PEM [Ken93] can cause anyone
in the entire system to accept an arbitrary forgery
(deﬁned to be an incorrect name/key binding, in-
serted into the system maliciously).
Recent interest in authentication systems cen-
ters on systems requiring a certain number of
keys(morethan one) to be compromisedbeforea
forgeryisaccepted. Thisworkgenerallyfocusses
on the concept of a trust metric, deﬁned here as a
function that computes a trust value from a set of
digitally signed certiﬁcates. Informally, a good
trust metric ensures that there are really multiple
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independent sources of certiﬁcation, and rejects
(by assigning low trust values) assertions with in-
sufﬁcient certiﬁcation.
The previous work raises many questions, in-
cluding:
￿ To which kinds of attack is a trust metric re-
sistant?
￿ Which trust metric is best?
￿ How well do these trust metrics work?
This paper answersthese questionsby analysis
of the possible attacksagainst trust metrics. After
introducing a certiﬁcate system and its mapping
to a graph model (Section 2) and more formally
deﬁning the notion of a trust metric (Section 3),
we present an analytical framework for quanti-
fying the success of various attacks against trust
models (Section 4).
To make the analysis tractable, this paper
makes two assumptions. First, we assume
that most good name/key bindings are accepted.
This assumption is not always valid—for high-
security applications, it may be desirable to have
a very restricted “guest list.” However, for ap-
plications such as key distribution for IP secu-
rity [Atk95] and widespread secure e-mail, it is a
validassumption. Insuchapplications,ifthetrust
metric often rejects good name/key bindings,
then either connections often fail, or else they
must be established insecurely. In either case,
a trust metric that accepts most good name/key
bindings would seem to be a better alternative.
The second assumption is that the name space
is opaque, i.e. no informationcan be gained from
the name itself. Most Internet names have some
structure, but relationships between names often# nodes needed # nodes needed # edges needed
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Figure 1: A comparison of the trust metrics.
have little to do with certiﬁcation relationships,
which makes this structure difﬁcult to exploit.
Given this background, the remainder of the
paperisdevotedtoansweringtheprecedingques-
tions, summarized as follows:
￿ No trust metric can protect against attacks
on
d keys or more, where
d is the minimum
number of certiﬁers on any widely accepted
key (Section 5).
￿ There is an optimal trust metric based on
maximum network ﬂow. Such a metric pro-
tects againstalmost anyattack on fewerthan
d keys (Section 6).
￿ Of previously published trust metrics, the
Reiter & Stubblebine[RS97a] trustmetric is
close to optimal,while theMaurertrust met-
ric [Mau96] is easily attacked (Section 7).
Another contribution of the paper is to distin-
guish between two different types of attacks on
certiﬁcation systems. The most general form of
attack assumesthatthe attackeris capableofgen-
erating arbitrary certiﬁcates. This attack corre-
sponds to stealing the secret keys of the victim,
and is called a node attack.
However, a far more restricted attack is effec-
tive against many of the trust metrics and can be
easily mounted without stealing secret keys. It
sufﬁcesto trickownersofthesecretkeysintocer-
tifying that untrustworthy keys are trustworthy;
this attack is called an edge attack. Fortunately,
it is possible to design trust metrics to be more
resistant to edge attacks than to node attacks.
Figure 1 is a table that brieﬂy summarizes
these results. Here, “shortest path” is the trust
metric that simply measures the length of the
shortest chain from client to target. “Maurer” is
a simpliﬁed version of the trust metric proposed
by Maurer [Mau96]. “Reiter & Stubblebine” is
the bounded vertex disjoint path metric as de-
scribed in [RS97a]. “Maxﬂow” is the maximum
network ﬂow metric optimized for node attacks
(Section 6). “Maxﬂow-edge” is the maximum
network ﬂow metric optimized for edge attacks
(Section6.2). Inthistable,
d isthenumberofcer-
tiﬁcates issued for each key in the system, and
￿
isafactorindicatingtheamountofsharingofcer-
tiﬁcation keys, generally in the range of [0.5..1]
(see Section 5.4).
2 Certiﬁcates and graphs
The input to the trust model is a set of digi-
tally signed certiﬁcates, while the evaluation of
the trust model is based on a graph. Depend-
ing on the details of the certiﬁcate formats them-
selves, a number of different mappings from cer-
tiﬁcates to graphs are possible. For the purposes
of this paper, we use a simple but realistic certiﬁ-
cate format and mapping into a graph.
In this example model, there are keys, names,
and two types of certiﬁcates. A binding certiﬁ-
cateis anassertionoftheform“Ibelievethatsub-
ject key
k isthekeybelongingto name
n”, signed
by an issuer key. A delegationcertiﬁcate is an as-
sertion of the form “I trust certiﬁcates signed by
subjectkey
k”, againsignedbyanissuerkey. The
“I” in these statements refers to the holder of the
private key corresponding to the issuer’s publiccertiﬁcate type issuer subject
delegation key Ak e y B
delegation key Bk e y C
delegation key Ck e y D
binding key D( k e y J, “Jack”)
delegation key Ak e y E
delegation key Ek e y F
binding key F( k e y J, “Jack”)
delegation key Ek e y G
delegation key Gk e y H
delegation key Hk e y I
binding key I( k e y J, “Jack”)
Figure 2: An example set of certiﬁcates.
key.
This model corresponds fairly closely to the
PGP certiﬁcate model [PGP95] extended with
“introducer certiﬁcates,” not present in any cur-
rent implementation of PGP but proposed as a
future extension. It also resembles an X.509
certiﬁcation system [X509] with opaque names
(as opposed to distiguished names) and cross-
certiﬁcation.
This model is somewhat simplistic compared
to real-world certiﬁcation schemes. For example,
it includes no time-dependent behavior such as
validity periods or revocation. The model does
not distinguish different kinds of certiﬁcate is-
suers, which might be users creating their own
certiﬁcates or trusted third parties. Some of the
assumptions regarding the graph structure are
more realistic for user-created certiﬁcates.
The mapping is as follows: Each key is a node
of the graph. In addition, each (key, name) pair is
also a node. Each delegation certiﬁcate maps to
anedgefromthenodecorrespondingtotheissuer
key to the node corresponding to the subject key.
Each bindingcertiﬁcate mapsto an edgefrom the
node corresponding to the issuer key to the node
corresponding to the (key, name) binding. Fig-
ure 2 shows an example set of certiﬁcates, and
Figure 3 shows the corresponding graph.
Let
G be a certiﬁcate graph. The nodes of
G
are either key nodes
V
k or target nodes
V
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G
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3 Trust models on graphs
This section deﬁnes the notion of a trust model
as evaluated on graphs. Given a certiﬁcate graph
G,asource node
s
2
V
k,a n datarget node
t
2
V
t, the evaluationof the trustmodelresults in
a real number, interpreted as the degree to which
the source key should trust the target. Formally,
the trust metric is represented as a real-valued
function
M
(
G
;
s
;
t
). The trust model is sensitive
only to the structure of the graph, not the names.
Thus, the trust metric must give the same value
for isomorphic graphs.
In an automated setting, the source
s does not
use therealnumberdirectly,butsimplycompares
it with a threshold
￿
(
s
) to determine whether the
target is trustworthy. Formally, a key
s accepts
a target
t iff
M
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
￿
￿
(
s
). Little is lost
by expressing the trust metric in terms of accep-
tance rather than real numbers—by performing
multiple experiments with different thresholds, it
is possible to reconstruct the numbers with high
accuracy. Thus, where it is simpler, we use ac-
ceptance to characterize trust metrics. To avoidworking directly with real values for the
￿ func-
tion, we often express
￿ in percentiles, e.g.
￿
(
s
)
is set so that
s accepts 95% of all targets.
4 Attack models
We consider two different types of attack. In a
node attack, the attacker is able to generate any
certiﬁcate from the attacked key. Thus, in a node
attack, the attacker may add arbitrary edges (rep-
resentingdelegationorbindingcertiﬁcates)in the
graph. This attack is feasible when the attacker
obtains the private keying material, for example
by stealing a password.
In an edge attack, by contrast, the attacker is
only able to generatea delegationcertiﬁcate from
the attacked key. This attack is feasible when the
attacker is able to convince the owner of the at-
tacked key that an untrustworthy subject key is
trustworthy.
We also assume that the attacker is capable of
removing arbitrary certiﬁcates from any key and
generating arbitrary certiﬁcates from newly cre-
ated keys under its control. Removing a certiﬁ-
cate is realized by performing a denial-of-service
attack on the communication of the certiﬁcate to
the system requesting it.
For each attack scenario, the number of keys
attacked is ﬁxed, counting only keys for which
certiﬁcates are added.
We now formally present the notion of edge
and node attacks on graphs. Given an original
certiﬁcate graph
G
=
(
V
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V
t
;
E
), an attack is
represented by a new graph
G
0
=
(
V
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V
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E
0
).
All of the nodes and edges in
G are presumed to
be “good.” The new graph, however, contains at
least one new target node
x
2
V
0
t
￿
V
t which
represents the forgery.
Given a graph
G, the graph
G
0 is a possible
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This predicate states that
G
0 cannot contain
any new edges from nodes in
G that are not un-
der attack. Thus, all new edges in
G
0 must come
from either a node attack or a new node.
In an edge attack, the edges in
G
0 are further
constrained so that no edges from attacked nodes
go directly to targets, only to other key nodes.
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The last predicate simply states that attacks
must satisfy both the
N
Aand
E
A
0 predicates.
A consequence of the
E
A constraint is that
none of the edges from attacked nodes point di-
rectly to the target
x. Thus, in any path from
s to
x, the attacked node must be at least distance 2
away from
x.
4.1 Quantifying the success of an attack
A central contribution of this paper is an ana-
lytical framework for quantifying the success of
attacks and thus the quality of the trust metric.
Trust metrics that make attacks less successful
are better.
The success of an attack is most directly mea-
sured as the fraction of source keys in
V
k accept-
ing the forgery
x. Obviously, this fraction de-
pends on the
￿
(
s
) values for the source key. If
a source key is tuned to accept very few targets,
thenit canreject most forgeriesas well (inthe ex-
treme, acceptingno targetsis also 100%effective
against forgeries). Thus, all measures of success
assume ﬁxed target accept rates. For example, it
would be reasonable to ﬁx
￿
(
s
) for each source
key
s so that it accepts 95% of targets. With
￿
(
s
)
ﬁxed for each key, it is meaningful to discuss the
fraction of source keys that accept a forgery from
a speciﬁc attack. Formally, the success fraction
of an attack
G
0 on a trust metric
M is given as:
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Figure 4: An attack.
For node attacks, it is easier to specify the at-
tack as a set of attacked nodes, rather than an at-
tack graph. The actual graph chosen maximizes
the chance of success given the node attack con-
straint NA.
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Measuring the success of a particular attack
may be useful in some cases, but because the
space of individual attacks is so large, it is more
useful to characterize trust metrics in terms of
their response to classes of attacks. We consider
two major classes of attacks: those mounted by
randomly choosing nodes to attack, and those
mounted by choosing nodes to maximize attack
success. In both cases, the attacks are parameter-
ized by the number
n of keys attacked.
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It is always the case that
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) (i.e. a chosen attack is more
effective than a random one). The functions
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n are all deﬁned
analogously, using
E
Ain place of
N
A.
5 Best case analysis
In this section, we address the question: What
is the best possible performance of a trust met-
ric? To make this question tractable, we apply
two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
the indegree of every node in the graph is a con-
stant
d. Second,we assume that most sourcekeys
accept most targets in the certiﬁcate graph. More
formally,
￿
(
s
) of each source
s is set so that
s
accepts the fraction
w of all targets. In this anal-
ysis, we assume that most clients will want to ac-
cept most good targets, so a reasonable value for
w would be 99%. Given these assumptions, we
prove tight bounds on the best-case performance
of any possible graph-basedtrust metric in resist-
ing attacks.
The assumption of constant indegree
d instead
of a minimum indegree seems to be necessary
to avoid overly centralized graphs, i.e. ones in
which most nodes have a single edge to a central
node. Such a graph meeting a minimum indegree
constraint is easily constructed, but has the obvi-
ous weakness that an attack on the central node
will cause most keys to accept forgeries.
There are several cases, each of which has a
slightly different analysis. The general plan is to
describe a feasible attack resulting in a graph
G
0
isomorphic to the original graph
G (modulo un-
reachable nodes), with a forgery
x in place of a
victim
v. No trust metric can distinguish the two
graphs, thus clients accept the forgery
x with the
same success fraction as they accepted the victim
v.
The idea of the attack is shown graphically in
Figure 4, showing how the original graph of Fig-ure 3 is modiﬁed—all edges to the victim, in this
case (key J, “Jack”), are removed and replaced
with edges to the forgery, here (key X, “Jack”).
The nodes attacked (key D, key F, and key I) are
highlighted with wedges.
We consider the following classes of attacks:
￿ Node attack with a given certiﬁcate graph
and the attacker chooses the attacked nodes
(Section 5.1).
￿ Node attack with a random certiﬁcate graph
and the attacked nodes chosen randomly
(Section 5.2).
￿ Node attack with a given certiﬁcate graph
and the attacker chooses a single attacked
node (Section 5.3)
￿ Edge attack with a given certiﬁcate graph
and the attacker chooses the attacked nodes
(Section 5.4).
In cases where attacks succeed against ran-
domly chosen nodes, the analysis of the chosen
node case is not necessary—if the attack works
in the former case, it certainly works in the lat-
ter. Further, there is a theoretical problem with
mounting an attack with randomly chosen at-
tackednodesagainsta givencertiﬁcategraph: the
trustmetriccouldjustcomparetheattackedgraph
against the originalgraphand reject any certiﬁca-
tions if they don’t match, an unfair advantage to
the trust metric in practice. By showing that the
attack works against random graphs, we suggest
that it works against most realistic certiﬁcation
graphs.
5.1 Node attack; given certiﬁcate graph;
attacker chooses nodes
In the ﬁrst case, we assume a ﬁxed certiﬁcate
graphwiththeconstraintthattheindegreeofeach
node is
d. The attack is simple. First, the at-
tacker identiﬁes the node
v that is accepted by
the largest number of keys. Then, the attacker
chooses the
d predecessors of that node to attack.
Finally, the attacker removes
v and its predeces-
sor edges (recall that we assume attackers can re-
move arbitrary edges, see Section 4), and gener-
ates new certiﬁcates from each of
v’s predeces-
sors to the forgery node
x.
If all keys accept at least the fraction
w of tar-
gets, then there must be a target
v that is accepted
by at least the fraction
w of the keys (using the
pigeonhole principle). Thus, the success fraction
is at least
w.
The attack works even if the assumption that
sources accept
w fraction of all good targets is
relaxed. It sufﬁces that there is a single target
which is widely accepted by a large fraction of
clients, which is very likely in any certiﬁcation
system.
5.2 Node attack; random certiﬁcate
graph; attacked nodes chosen ran-
domly
Consider the following procedure for gener-
ating a random certiﬁcate graph. First choose
the number of nodes. Second, for each node
n,
choose
d random predecessors (other than
n).
The attack is as follows. Choose a node
v at
random. Remove
v and its predecessor edges.
Generate
d random edges from the remaining
nodes to a new node
x.
The resulting graph is clearly a member of the
set of graphs that may be generated by the ran-
dom process. Further, it should be clear that the
distribution is identical to that of the original ran-
dom process for constructing graphs. Therefore,
no metric can distinguish between the graphs
generated randomly and attacked graphs derived
from those generated randomly.
5.3 Node attack; given certiﬁcate graph;
a single node is chosen randomly
For this attack, we assume that the attack is on
one node chosen randomly. For certiﬁcate graphs
with large constant indegree, such an attack can-
not be very successful, but for certiﬁcate graphs
in which a substantial fraction of the nodes have
indegree 1 (as is the case with the certiﬁcate
graph stored on the PGP keyservers [McB96]),
the attack can have some success.
The attack only works if the attacked node has
a successor
v with indegree 1. The attack itselfis analogous to those above. Remove
v from the
graph, generate an edge from the attacked node
to
x, and generate edges from
x to the successors
of
v. The resulting graph is isomorphic to the
original.
Assuming that keys are tuned to accept all
good nodes, the success fraction
p is equal to the
fractionof nodesthat have successorsofindegree
1 (call this fraction
f
1). Assuming that keys ac-
cept good targets with probability at least
w,t h e n
the success fraction is at least
p
=
(
1
￿
(
1
￿
w
)
=
(
1
￿
f
1
)
) (this formula is the lower bound of
the probability of the conjunction of two events
when the events are not guaranteed to be inde-
pendent).
5.4 Edge attack; given certiﬁcate graph;
attacker chooses nodes
Let
p
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v,a n dl e t
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). The attack
is as follows: ﬁnd a node
v accepted by a suf-
ﬁciently large number of keys and that has the
smallest
p
r
e
d
2
(
v
), which are the nodes attacked.
For each node
n in
p
r
e
d
(
v
), generate a new
node
n
0. Remove all the edges from
p
r
e
d
2
(
v
) to
p
r
e
d
(
v
), replacing them with edges to the newly
created nodes.
The number of nodes that must be attacked is
bounded from above by
d
2. In practice, there is
some
￿ such that there exists a widely accepted
node
n with
￿
d
2
=
j
p
r
e
d
2
(
n
)
j. In this formu-
lation,
￿ is bounded from above by 1. It is very
near one for random graphs, and it is hoped to
be fairly high (greater than 0.5, say) for realistic
certiﬁcation graphs.
6 Network ﬂow trust metric
This section presents a trust metric based
on maximum network ﬂows over the certiﬁcate
graph. Theanalysisofthistrustmetricshowsthat
its performance almost exactly matches the best
case bounds presented above.
The trust metric is deﬁned as follows. As
before, let
s be the source and
t be the target.
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Figure 5: Node capacities for network ﬂow trust
metric.
Each node
n in the graph is assigned a capacity
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
n
) =m a x
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where dist
(
s
;
t
) is the length of the shortest path
through the graph from
s to
t. The trust metric is
parameterized by the exact deﬁnitions of
f
s and
g
t.
In this section, we present
f
s and
g
t designed
to resist node attacks, but not to do particularly
well against edge attacks. Let
s
u
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) be the set
of successors of
s.D e ﬁ n e
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These values are calculated to result in a net-
work maxﬂow of 1 for most
(
s
;
t
) pairs in the
certiﬁcate graph. These valuesfor
f
s and
g
t guar-
antee that the number of nodes with
C
(
n
)
>
1
=
d
is no greater than
d.
An example is shown in Figure 5, in which
eachnode(exceptforthesourceandtargetnodes)is annotated with its capacity. In this example,
d
=
3,
f
s
(
1
)
=
0
:
5,
f
s
(
2
:
:
:
)
=
:
3
3
3,a n d
g
t
(
1
:
:
:
)
=
0
:
3
3
3 (actually, the
d
=
3 constraint
is only met for the target node—additional edges
needed to satisfy
d
=
3for all nodes are omitted
for brevity).
This example demonstrates why raising node
capacities near the source improves security. If
the node capacities were constant, they would
need to be set at 0.5 to ensure a maxﬂow of
1. With these settings, most attacks on two
nodes succeed. With capacities raised near the
source, the only successful two node attack is on
f
k
e
y
B
;
k
e
y
E
g. Considering a random attack,
as the graph grows the probability of choosing
nodes that are all near any given source key be-
comes much lower. Even considering a chosen
node attack, attacking nodes near one source will
not in general be effective against other sources.
In another example, assume a random certiﬁ-
cate graph as described in Section 5.2 and the
unit capacity maxﬂow metric. Since roughly half
of the nodes in such a graph will have outdegree
less than
d, thethresholdmustbeset atlessthan
d
for approximately half of the keys, implying that
half of all source keys accept an attack on
d
￿
1
keys.
To summarize, in a well-connected graph (i.e.
multiple paths between most nodes), with con-
stant capacities, the trust metric is limited by the
minimum of the outdegree of the source and the
indegree of the target. With capacities increased
near the source, the trust metric is limited only by
the indegree of the target.
6.1 Analysis: node attacks
The best case analysisshows that a node attack
on
d nodes is likely to be successful, no matter
which trust metric is used. This section shows
that, with the network ﬂow trust metric, a node
attack on
d
￿
1 nodes is unlikely to be successful.
Thus, the network ﬂow metric is nearly optimal
against node attacks.
We assume an attack where the attacker
chooses the nodes to be attacked, as it subsumes
the random case (i.e. a trust metric which suc-
cessfully resists a chosen node attack also resists
a randomizedattack). We ﬁrst ﬁx a set
S ofnodes
to attack. Given this set, we analyze the fraction
V
k that will accept the forgery. Our goal is to ﬁnd
a tight upper bound on this fraction.
Let us deﬁne a node
s as susceptible to an at-
tack on
S iff there exists a node
u in
S such
that
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
u
)
>
1
=
d. For any set of nodes
S
where
j
S
j
=
l there can be no more than
l
d sus-
ceptible nodes, because the indegree
d is ﬁxed,
and because the set of susceptible nodes is con-
tained in the predecessors of nodes in
S. Thus, at
least the fraction
1
￿
l
d
=
j
V
k
j of all nodes
u
2
S
have
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
u
)
=
1
=
d. We know that
S is a cut
of
G
0 because the
N
A predicate ensures that all
edges from
V
k to the new nodes (
V
0
k
￿
V
k)o r i g -
inate from the attacked keys. Therefore, the to-
tal network ﬂow is bounded by
￿
u
2
S
:
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
u
),
w h i c hi nt h i sc a s ei sn om o r et h a n
l
=
d. Thus,
for at least
1
￿
l
d
=
j
V
k
j of the source nodes, at-
tacks on less than
d nodes fail (i.e. for all
l
<
d ,
p
n
o
d
e
c
h
o
s
e
n
(
G
;
x
;
l
)
￿
l
d
=
j
V
k
j).
Itshouldbeclearthat
p
n
o
d
e
c
h
o
s
e
n
(
G
;
x
;
l
) falls
off very quickly as
l decreases. In the case where
s has at least
d successors,
s will not accept any
attack on less than
d nodes.
6.2 Edge attacks
Here are
f
s and
g
t tuned to resist edge attacks:
f
s
(
l
)
=
8
<
:
max
(
1
d
;
1
j
s
u
c
c
(
s
)
j if
l
=
1
max
(
1
￿
d
2
;
1
j
s
u
c
c
2
(
s
)
j
) if
l
=
2
1
￿
d
2 if
l
￿
3
g
t
(
l
)
=
￿
1
d if
l
=
1
1
￿
d
2 if
l
￿
2
Again, we expect there to be a maxmimum
ﬂ o wo f1f o rm o s t
(
s
;
t
) pairs in the graph. For
certiﬁcate graphs expected to arise in practice,
values of
￿ inthe range
[
0
:
5
:
:
1
]will lead toa high
rate of acceptance. For random graphs,
￿ can be
very near unity.
An example is given in Figure 6, in which the
immediate successors of
s and immediate pre-
decessors of
t have capacity 0.333 and all other
nodes have capacity .125. The example also
shows why a value of 1 for
￿ is not reasonable—
in this case, it would cause
s to reject
t becauset
.125 .125
min cut
.333
.333
.333
.333
.333
.333
s
Figure 6: Node capacities for metric tuned for edge attacks.
the predecessorsof
t share some predecessors. In
this example, setting
￿
=
0
:
8
8
8 ensures that
s
accepts
t.
6.3 Analysis: edge attacks
The analysis is analogous to that for node
attacks, similarly assuming that the attacker
chooses the nodes to attack.
Analogous to Section 6.1, let us deﬁne a node
s as susceptible to an edge attack on
S iff there
exists a node
u for which
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
u
)
>
1
￿
d
2 and
u
6
2
p
r
e
d
(
t
). The number of susceptible nodes is
no more than
d
+
d
2, by of the deﬁnition of
f
s.
Thus, at least the fraction
1
￿
k
(
d
+
d
2
)
=
j
V
k
j of
all nodes
u
2
S have
C
(
s
;
t
)
(
u
)
=
1
￿
d
2.
The total network ﬂow from
s to
t is bounded
by the minimum cut across the nodes, and hence
any cut. Consider the cut across nodes
S,w h i c h
in this case is no more than
k
=
(
￿
d
2
). Thus, for at
least the fraction
1
￿
k
(
d
+
d
2
)
=
j
V
k
j of all node,
edge attacks on less than
￿
d
2 nodes fail.
7 Comparison to related work
Our analytical framework for evaluating trust
metrics is new but was inspired by the work of
Reiter and Stubblebine [RS97a, RS97b]. Their
discussion of the bounded vertex disjoint paths
trust model gave one criterion for resistance to
attack: with a threshold of
k independent paths,
attacks on
k
￿
1 or fewer nodes will never suc-
ceed. In [RS97b], Reiter and Stubblebine show a
clear exampleofa trustmetric that is not resistant
to attack—theydemonstratethat in the BBK trust
metric [BBK94], an attack on a single node can
result in arbitrary manipulationof the trust value.
This paper extends their initial work into an ana-
lytical framework for comparing trust models in
a variety of attack situations.
The general approach of using maximum net-
work ﬂow has been proposed independently by
David Johnson, as mentioned in [RS97a]. A dif-
ferent trust metric based on maximum network
ﬂow was proposed in [RS97b]. To our knowl-
edge, the idea of increasing the node capacities
near the source and target of the query is new. In-
creasing the capacities near both the source and
target has a small effect on node attacks (because
the metric is alreadyclose to the bound),but does
greatly improve resistance to edge attacks—fromst
Figure 7: A graph with a bottleneck.
d to
￿
d
2.
Reiter andStubblebine[RS97a]proposeatrust
metricbasedoncountingboundedvertex-disjoint
paths. In the absence of a path length bound, this
trust metric is equivalent to maximum network
ﬂow with unit capacities. The question remains:
does the imposition of the path length bound im-
prove the metric? Here, we argue that the answer
is no.
Assume that trust metric
M
1 is maximum ﬂow
(without a bound) and a threshold of
k
1,a n dt h a t
trust metric
M
2 is bounded vertex disjoint paths
and a threshold of
k
2. For the metrics to be com-
pared directly, source keys must have similar tar-
get accept rates. Because the bound causes fewer
independentpathsto be accepted,
k
1
>
k
2 . Thus,
there is a class of attacks on
k
2 keys accepted
by
M
2 but not
M
1. It is important to stress that
this analysis depends on the assumption that the
metric accepts most good keys. For metrics that
accept only a fraction of the good keys, length
bounds in metrics may be useful.
An intriguing metric proposed by [Mau96] as-
signs probabilities to each edge and performs a
randomized experiment on whether the target is
reachable fromthe source. Maurer’spaper used a
different certiﬁcate format and mapping than as-
sumed here. Maurer’s graphs have two different
kinds of edges, but it is possible to consider a
simpliﬁed form of his model in which there is a
single edge. If we assume that the probabilities
on the edges are constant across the entire graph,
then as the probability goes to zero, the Maurer
trust metric becomes consistent with the shortest
path trust metric. As the probability goes to one,
the Maurer trust metric becomes consistent with
a maximum network ﬂow with unit capacities as-
signed to edges. Appendix A presents proofs of
these statements. Such a trust metric is reason-
ably effective against edge attacks, but succumbs
to an attack on a single node. For example, in the
graph shown in Figure 7, there are three edge-
independent paths from
s to
t, but such a graph
can be compromisedby attacking the single node
at the bottleneck.
8 Discussion
We havepresentedananalytical frameworkfor
understanding how a trust metric can be used to
resist attacks. Our main assumption is that keys
should accept most good targets. We have pre-
sented both a best-case theoretical limit on how
well trust metrics can perform and a practical
trust metric (based on network ﬂows) that meets
this limit. Conversely, the fact that the limit is
met demonstrates that the attack described in the
theoreticalanalysis (Section5) is optimal—anat-
tackershouldalwaystrytoattackthekeysnearest
the victim node. Undera nodeattack, the number
of nodes that need be attacked is the indegree of
the target.
To a ﬁrst approximation, good trust metrics
measure the indegree of the target node. Us-
ing a trust metric, then, is only effective if ev-
ery accepted target has a high indegree. Thus, a
trust metric is not particularly helpful on existing
certiﬁcate graphs such as the PGP key database
[McB96], in which about 35% of the keys in the
strongly connected subgraph have one predeces-
sor. Each source key has the choice between
rejecting a large fraction of the graph or being
highly vulnerable to single key forgeries.
We have also distinguished between node at-
tacks (in which the attacker can generate any cer-
tiﬁcate from a compromised key) and edge at-tacks (in which the attacker can only generate
delegation certiﬁcates to an untrustworthyparty).
We have presented a trust metric that is far more
resistant to edge attacks than to node attacks. For
realistic values, say
d
=
1
0 (every key is certi-
ﬁed by at least 10 others) and
￿
=
0
:
5,a na t -
tacker would require 10 keys in a node attack or
50keysina edgeattacktosuccessfullyperpetrate
a forgery.
Thus, for an attack-resistant key infrastructure
based on trust metrics to be viable, the owner of
everykeymustbewillingandabletohavea num-
ber of people to certify it. Resisting attacks is
possible, but increases the cost of certiﬁcation.
Only practical experience with a prototype sys-
tem can determine whether this tradeoffis worth-
while.
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Appendix A
This appendix presents proofs that the Maurer
trust metric becomes consistent with the shortest
path and edge-constrained maxﬂow trust metrics
when the edge probability tends to zero or one,
respectively.
First, the deﬁnition of consistency: Two trust
metrics are consistent with each other over a
graph
G if for all keys, there are no pairs of tar-
gets that are ordered inconsistently by the met-
rics, i.e.
M
1 and
M
2 are consistent over
G iff:
8
s
;
t
1
;
t
2
:
:
(
(
M
1
(
G
;
s
;
t
1
)
>
M
1
(
G
;
s
;
t
2
)
^
M
2
(
G
;
s
;
t
1
)
<
M
2
(
G
;
s
;
t
2
)
)
_
(
M
1
(
G
;
s
;
t
1
)
<
M
1
(
G
;
s
;
t
2
)
^
M
2
(
G
;
s
;
t
1
)
>
M
2
(
G
;
s
;
t
2
)
)
)
Clearly, the existence of a monotonic function
f such that
f
(
M
1
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
)
=
M
2
(
G
;
s
;
t
) is a
sufﬁcient condition that
M
1 and
M
2 are consis-
tent with each other.
Consistency is a weaker relationship than
equivalence; it is possible for two trust metrics
to be consistent even if they differ in granularity.
In the extreme case, the constant trust metric is
consistent with all other trust metrics. Thus, the
Maurer trust metric may be somewhat “better”
than its counterparts because of its ﬁner granu-
larity.
Next, we formally deﬁne the trust metric. The
trust metricdescribedhereis actuallya simpliﬁedversion of that presented in [Mau96]. One sim-
pliﬁcation is that the probability associated with
each edge is a constant
p; in the original metric,
the probability can vary depending on user input,
or can be encoded in the certiﬁcates themselves.
The other major simpliﬁcation is to use a graph
with only one type of edge, a consequence of
specifying the subject of a delegation certiﬁcate
by key, rather than name.
We use MM
p to denote the trust metric de-
rivedfromassigningthe probability
p to all edges
in the graph. We deﬁne MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
) to be the
probability that, in randomized experiments in
which each edge in
G is colored black with prob-
ability
p, there exists a path from
s to
t consisting
entirely of black edges.
We use SP to denote the shortest path metric.
SP
(
G
;
s
;
t
) is deﬁned as zero minus the shortest
pathfrom
s to
t in graph
G, reﬂectingthefactthat
shorter paths are to be considered more trustwor-
thy than longer paths.
We use EDP to denote the edge disjoint path
metric. EDP
(
G
;
s
;
t
) is deﬁned as the number of
edge-disjoint paths from
s to
t in graph
G.
A.1 Proof for p tending to 0
We prove that MM
p becomes consistent with
SP as
p tends to zero. We show this by presenting
a monotonic function
f that maps MM
p to SP,
deﬁned as:
f
(
x
)
=max
x
￿
p
￿
i
i
;
i integer
We make use of the fact that for monotonic
predicates
P,
j
= max
P
(
i
)
i iff
P
(
i
) and
:
P
(
i
+
1
).
Thus, to show that
f
(MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
)
=
SP
(
G
;
s
;
t
), it sufﬁces to show the lower bound
MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
￿
pSP
(
G
;
s
;
t
) and the upper bound
MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
<
p SP
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
￿
1.
The lower bound is trivial. Let
l denote the
length of the shortest path from
s to
t. Con-
siderthesubgraphof
G containingonlya shortest
path from
s to
t.T h ev a l u eo fMM
p on this sub-
graph is computed as
p
l, using the series combi-
nation rule (Figure 8). Since the Maurer metric
is monotonic (i.e.
G
0
￿
G
) MM
p
(
G
0
;
s
;
t
)
￿
MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)), and SP
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
=
￿
l, the lower
bound follows.
To demonstrate the upper bound, we ﬁrst com-
pute a breadth-ﬁrst search of
G, for each node
n
assigning
d
(
n
)
= the length of the shortest path
from
s to
n. We then calculate, for each path
length
l, an upper bound
u
(
l
) on the probabil-
ity that at least one node
n such that
d
(
n
)
=
l
is reachable on an all-black path from s, assum-
ing each edge is colored black with independent
probability
p.
The calculation is by induction. In the base
case,
u
(
0
)
=
1trivially.
In the induction step, if no nodes at distance
l
￿
1 are black-reachable, then no nodes at dis-
tance
l could be black-reachable. Thus, it suf-
ﬁces to compute an upper bound on the condi-
tional probability that at least one node at dis-
tance
l is black-reachable given that at least one
node at distance
l
￿
1 is black-reachable. This
conditional probability is no greater than
p
j
E
j.
Thus,
u
(
l
)
=
p
j
E
j
u
(
l
￿
1
)
=
(
p
j
E
j
)
l .
The proof is completed by ﬁnding a value of
p
0 such that for all
p
<
p
0 ,
u
(
l
)
<
p
l
￿
1 . Solving
for equality, we have:
(
p
j
E
j
)
l
=
p
l
￿
1
p
j
E
j
l
=
1
p
=
j
E
j
￿
l
By choosing
p
0 to solve this equation for the
maximumpossiblevalueof
l (
d
i
a
m, thediameter
of the graph),we satisfy the inequalityfor all
p
<
p
0and all
l
￿
d
i
a
m. Thus, with
p
0
=
j
E
j
￿
d
i
a
m
the result is proved.
A.2 Proof for p tending to 1
We prove that MM
p becomes consistent with
EDP as
p tends to one. We show this by present-
ing a monotonic function
f that maps MM
p to
EDP,d e ﬁ n e da s :ab
pq p q
ab
Figure 8: Series combination rule for Maurer metric.
ab
q
p
1-(1-pq)
ab
Figure 9: Parallel combination rule for Maurer metric.
f
(
x
)
=max
x
￿
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
)
i
i,
i integer
As in the shortest path case, we show that
f
(MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
)
= EDP
(
G
;
s
;
t
) by show-
ing the lower bound MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
￿
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
)EDP
(
G
;
s
;
t
) and the upper bound
MM
p
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
<
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
)EDP
(
G
;
s
;
t
)
+
1.
To show the lower bound,choose the subgraph
which contains only
k vertex-disjoint paths from
s to
t. By using the series rule (Figure 8), each
path reduces to a single edge of probability
p
l,
where
l is the path length. Because no path can
be longer than
d
i
a
m edges, the probabilityon the
edge is bounded from below by
p
d
i
a
m.U s i n gt h e
parallel combination rule (Figure 9), these edges
reduce to a single edge with probability
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
)
k.
To show the upper bound, consider that be-
cause there are only
k edge-disjoint paths, there
is a set of edges
F
;
j
F
j
=
k such that removing
those edges blocks all black paths. By compu-
tation, the probability of all these edges being re-
movedis
(
1
￿
p
)
k. Thus, the probabilityof an all-
blackpathis boundedfromaboveby
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
)
k.
To establish the upper bound, we must show that
there exists some
p
1 such that for all
p
>
p
1,
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
1
)
k
<
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
1
)
k
+
1, or equiva-
lently
(
1
￿
p
1
)
k
>
(
1
￿
p
d
i
a
m
1
)
k
+
1.
Because
p
n
￿
1
￿
(
1
￿
p
)
n for all
0
￿
p
￿
1
and all
n
>
0 , this inequality is implied by:
(
1
￿
p
1
)
k
>
(
(
1
￿
p
1
)
d
i
a
m
)
k
+
1
By simple algebra, this is equvalent to:
p
>
1
￿
1
=
(
d
i
a
m
k
+
1
)
Thus, choosing
p
1
=
1
￿
1
=
(
d
i
a
m
k
+
1
) sat-
isﬁes the inequality. Because
p
1 monotonically
increases with
k, setting it for the highest possi-
ble value of
k will satisfy the inequality for all
s
and
t.
These two proofs characterize the behavior of
the Maurer metric for values of
p near 0 and 1,
but not for values in between. As might be ex-
pected, simulations with the metric over various
certiﬁcate graphs indicate that its performance is
intermediate between these two cases for inter-
mediate values of
p.